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Police Warning in Drunk Driver Tests
Richard Galex*
P ROMPTED BY SHOCKING REPORTS of police interrogation procedures, and
desirous of maintaining a just balance between the rights of the
state and the individual, the United States Supreme Court, in Miranda
v. Arizona,' found it necessary to restate the restraints which society
must observe in accordance with the Federal Constitution in cases of
criminal prosecutions of its citizens.
Miranda requires that any communications obtained in violation of
its mandate may not be used in evidence at the trial. It limits the appli-
cation of its warning to "in-custody interrogation," but goes no further
in delineating its precepts. The United States Supreme Court has not as
yet clearly discriminated between those cases in which Miranda applies
and those in which it does not. Of course, the rule is not expressly lim-
ited to the type of heinous crimes involved in the Miranda series of cases,
but the Court's decision furnishes no illustrations of the type of cases
which do not fall within the rule.
2
Recently, the Supreme Court specifically declined to consider the
applicability of Miranda to motor vehicle cases in general.3 The various
state courts are now being called upon to decide the extent of its appli-
cation and, in particular, whether the Miranda mandate controls in mis-
demeanor proceedings. 4 This article examines (1) the present status of
Miranda in relation to drinking driver traffic offenses as interpreted by
* B.A., Rutgers University; Law Clerk for the Office of the Public Defender of Mid-
dlesex County, New Jersey, summer of 1968; Third-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
1 Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
At 444-45 the Court ruled that "... the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privi-
lege against self-incrimination .... Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attQr-
ney, either retained or appointed."
2 State of Delaware v. Bliss, 238 A. 2d 848, 850 (Del. 1968).
3 Heller v. Connecticut, 389 U.S. 902, 88 S. Ct. 213, 19 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1967), cert. de-
nied; same case, below, see 226 A. 2d 521; but see: State v. Simmonds, 5 Conn. Cir.
178, 247 A. 2d 502 (1968), where the court ruled that, "recent decisions ... have made
it clear that the adequacy of procedural safeguards will not be judged on the basis
of whether the offense is a misdemeanor," citing, State v. Paulick, 277 Minn. 140, 146,
151 N.W. 2d 591 (1967); see State ex. rel. Plutshack v. State Department of Health
and Social Services, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 722, 155 N.W. 2d 549 (1968); DeJoseph v. State
of Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982, 87 S. Ct. 526, 17 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1966) (dissent from denial
of certiorari); McDonald v. Moore, 353 F. 2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1965); Harvey v. State
of Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 1965); Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397
S.W. 2d 364 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907, 87 S. Ct. 207, 17 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1966)
(and see dissent).
4 State of New Jersey v. Kenderski, 99 NJ. Super. 204, 239 A. 2d 249 (1968).
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the various courts, and (2) the necessity of extending the rule to these
offenses.
Rochin to Schmerber
As the number of people slaughtered on the highways escalates an-
nually, states continue to stiffen the penalties for "driving while under
the influence," in hopes of reducing the holocaust caused partly by
drivers who imbibe too freely. Effective enforcement of the law requires
proof of the intoxication at the point of arrest because of alcohol's dis-
sipating character. Motion pictures are often employed as the accused
is placed through a performance test requiring him to write his name
and address, pick up coins on the floor, and to close his eyes and touch
his hand to his nose. Likewise, blood and urine analyses are often taken.
The breathalyzer test is the most sophisticated and commonly employed
apparatus for measuring the level of intoxication.5 The problems arise
when Miranda warnings are not given prior to obtaining the incriminat-
ing evidence.
The history of the modem legal fate of the drinking driver begins
with the case of Rochin v. California6 (oddly enough a narcotics case).
At the request of the police the accused was stomach pumped to deter-
mine if he had swallowed any narcotic capsules. Ruling that it was "con-
duct that shocks the conscience," 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that the
coerced confession must be excluded because it offended the community's
sense of fair play and decency. The Court held that the defendant had
been denied his due process of law but did not find that the police con-
duct led to his self-incrimination. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
comparing real and testimonial evidence, concluded that there was no
difference between a coerced confession and a forced pumping of the
stomach.8 This distinction was (in later cases) to be elaborated upon by
the Court.
In Breithaupt v. Abram,9 petitioner was convicted of manslaughter
after causing an accident while driving a motor vehicle under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor. While he was unconscious, a physician took
a blood sample. Breithaupt instituted a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that the admission into evidence of the blood sample analysis was
a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
United States Supreme Court held that taking of blood did not violate
defendant's right to due process because the taking of the sample did
5 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, Criminal-Civil, 459-579 (2d ed. with 1968
supp.) 1966; see, People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 492, 499-502 (1954)
for illustrations and explanation of a "drunkometer" test.
6 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952).
7 Id. at 172.
8 Id. at 173.
9 352 U.S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408, 1 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1957).
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not offend the "sense of justice" of which it spoke in Rochin.' 0 Believing
that there is nothing basically offensive in taking blood samples, the
Court disregarded Frankfurter's relationship between coerced confes-
sions and coerced physical evidence. The United States Supreme Court,
citing Twining v. State of New Jersey" and Wolf v. Colorado,'1 2 sum-
marily rejected petitioner's claims of violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination caused by the admission into evi-
dence of the analysis report and an unlawful search and seizure, violative
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
It is important to note that Miranda was decided before Schmerber
v. State of California3 but in the same terms of court. Schmerber's car
had been in an accident, and he was taken to a hospital for treatment. He
was arrested and while still conscious (unlike Breithaupt), a sample of
his blood was taken. The sample indicated intoxication and was admit-
ted in evidence over defendant's objection. He contended that the with-
drawal of the blood and the admission of the analysis in evidence denied
him his due process of law, was an illegal search and seizure, deprived
him of a right to counsel, and violated his right against self-incrimination.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, rejected each of his
claims.
The Court rejected the due process of law argument for the same
reason that it later rejected Breithaupt's. The withdrawal did not offend
"that 'sense of justice' of which we spoke in Rochin v. California." 14
The search and seizure claim was rejected because the search of his body
was reasonable and incident to a lawful arrest supported by probable
cause.
1 5
10 Rochin v. California, supra note 6.
11 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908), held that the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not embrace the Fifth Amendment privilege.
12 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949), held that in a prosecution in a
state court for a state crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admis-
sion of relevant evidence even though obtained by an unreasonable search and sei-
zure. Note, however, that before Schmerber was decided, Twining and Wolf were
supplanted by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964),
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment secured against state invasion the same
privilege that the Fifth Amendment guaranteed against federal infringement, i.e.,
the right to be free from self-incrimination; and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct.
1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), holding that the exclusionary rule of federal prosecu-
tions must also be applied in state courts.
13 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966).
14 Ibid.
15 Id. Generally a policeman is required to obtain an arrest warrant when the mis-
demeanor does not occur in his presence. The Court dismissed the need for a war-
rant under these facts because the officer might reasonably have believed that he
was confronted with an emergency, where the delay necessary to obtain a warrant
would threaten the destruction of the evidence by a diminution in the percentage of
alcohol in the blood, which begins shortly after drinking stops. State of New Jersey
v. Swiderski, 94 N.J. Super. 14, 226 A. 2d 728 (1967); Also see, State v. Harbatuk, 95
N.J. Super. 54, 229 A. 2d 820 (1967); State v. Tolbert, 100 N.J. Super. 350, 241 A. 2d
865 (1968); But see, State v. Haud, 101 N.J. Super. 43, 242 A. 2d 888 (1968).
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Petitioner also claimed that since he was compelled to submit to the
test, though he objected on the advice of counsel, he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The Court ruled that since
petitioner was not entitled to assert the privilege under California law,
he had no greater right because counsel erroneously advised him that he
could assert it. "His claim is strictly limited to the failure of the police
to respect his wish, reinforced by counsel's advice, to be left inviolate." 16
The Court did, however, indicate that no issue was presented of coun-
sel's ability to assist petitioner in respect to any rights he did possess.
It cannot be suggested that had petitioner requested counsel he might
be refused, 17 but the Court avoided the question of whether he must be
advised of his right to an attorney."
The most controversial aspect of Schmerber concerns Fifth Amend-
ment rights. The Court held that "the privilege protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that
the withdrawal of blood and the use of the analysis in question in this
case did not involve compulsion to these ends." 19 Compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of "real or physical evidence"
does not violate the privilege. Since the blood test evidence, although an
incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony
nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the peti-
tioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.20 Thus a question-
able distinction was firmly established. Compulsion which produces real
or physical evidence does not violate the privilege, while the same com-
pulsion which elicits communications or testimony is forbidden.
Aftermath of Schmerber
Four dissenting justices disagreed with this distinction without a
difference and wrote separate opinions. Justice Black's dissent presented
the interesting view that the sole purpose of the test is to obtain "testi-
mony" from some person (the technician who analyzes the blood sample)
to prove that the petitioner had alcohol in his blood, and is "communi-
cative" in that it supplied information to enable a witness to communi-
cate to the court that the petitioner was drunk. Justice Black criticizes
the Court's narrow interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and indicates
that Miranda requires a broad and liberal construction of the privilege
rather than the limited view adopted in this case.21
16 Schmerber v. California, supra note 13 at 766.
17 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963).
18 Schmerber v. California, supra note 13 at 766.
19 Ibid. at 761.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 773-78.
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Although the margin was slim, the Court's rile has been reflected
in a majority of the state court drunk driving convictions despite the
failure to give the Miranda warnings. As illustrated in the following
cases, Schmerber has usually proven sufficient to rebuff any claim that
the accused was denied his constitutional rights.
In City of Piqua v. Hinger,22 the defendant was arrested in the City
of Piqua, Ohio, in 1967. He was taken to a police station, questioned,
given a performance test recorded on film and a breathalyzer test, then
advised of his constitutional rights, and finally charged with operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (a mis-
demeanor in Ohio).23 At defendant's trial in Piqua Municipal Court
these films were admitted into evidence and exhibited to the jury over
the objection of defendant's counsel that they were obtained in violation
of defendant's constitutional rights under Miranda.2 4 The defendant was
convicted of the offense.
While Hinger was convicted in the municipal court, a similar Ohio
case was being decided on appeal. City of Columbus v. Hayes, 25 in a
per curiam decision, ruled that "since the punishment for the offense
charged is not now such as to bring this case within the constitutional
limitations on custodial interrogation" no Miranda warnings are re-
quired and the conviction was confirmed.2 6
Hinger, in the meantime, appealed his conviction and the Court of
Appeals for Miami County reversed the judgment of conviction on the
ground that evidence of the physical tests performed should have been
suppressed on the theory of Miranda. Judge Kerns and a unanimous
court criticized the Hayes opinion for not stating a reason for its con-
clusion, as follows:
• . . we have encountered some difficulty in recognizing why
constitutional rights are any less sacred in misdemeanor cases than
in felony cases....
The distinction between misdemeanors and felonies is found in
the penalty provisions of the criminal law, and this distinction, which
is based entirely upon the place of possible confinement, has little or
nothing to do with the actual trial of a criminal case. How then
could this distinction affect the basic question of fairness which is
an inherent quality of every constitutional safeguard?
... The onerous prospect of confinement in the county jail
rather than the state penitentiary is hardly an adequate substitute
for a fair trial and, as a practical matter, it is well known that the
22 13 Ohio App. 2d 108, 234 N.E. 2d 323 (1967).
23 Ibid. The punishment for driving while intoxicated is governed by Ohio Rev.
Code §§ 4511.19 and 4511.99 (B) (Page's 1965 ed., with 1968 supp.). The penalty in-
cludes a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment of not less than three days nor more
than six months.
24 Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1.
25 9 Ohio App. 2d 38, 222 N.E. 2d 829 (1967).
26 Ibid.
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actual punishment for many felonies is less harsh and severe than
the penalties which may be inflicted in some misdemeanor cases.
27
Judge Kern's seemingly logical decision was soon reversed when the
Ohio Supreme Court settled the conflict.28 The Court indicated that the
issue to be decided was whether the ruling in Miranda is applicable in
misdemeanor cases. Ruling that the evidence was real or physical and
of the kind designated in Schmerber as unprotected by the Constitution,
the evidence was held to be constitutionally admissible irrespective of
whether the warnings required by Miranda are given. Thus the Court
never decided the basic issue of the case.
In Gottschalk v. Sueppel2 9 the accused contended that he had a
constitutional right to consult with counsel before consenting to or re-
fusing a chemical test. The court rejected his contention, holding that
these rights do not apply to an administrative proceeding resulting in
a license revocation.
In People v. Letterio,30 a New York court ruled that there is no
mandate requiring the court hearing a traffic case to advise the defend-
ant of his right to counsel. Justice Scileppi reasoned that,
... some may say that the right to counsel extends to all
crimes, we say that neither our State nor the Federal Constitution
requires (sic) the court having jurisdiction of a petty offense like
a traffic infraction, so to advise defendant.
... New York has long deemed traffic infractions as a form of
misconduct distinguishable from more serious breaches of the law.31
27 City of Piqua v. Hinger, supra note 22 at 112; also see, City of Toledo v. Frazer,
10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E. 2d 777 (1967), where the court held that until a man-
date comes from the Supreme Court of the United States it was not mandatory under
the Ohio Constitution to furnish counsel at public expense to indigent defendants
charged with a misdemeanor.
28 City of Piqua v. Hinger, 15 Ohio St. 2d 110, 238 N.E. 2d 766 (1968).
29 258 Ia. 1173, 140 N.W. 2d 866 (1966).
30 16 N.Y. 2d 307, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 368 (1965); cert. denied, 384 U.S. 911, 86A S. Ct. 1354
(1966); but see, People v. Phenney, 22 N.Y. 2d 288, 239 N.E. 2d 515 (1968), where
Chief Judge Fuld ruled that because traffic violations may have serious implications,
such precautions are generally governed by the rbles of criminal law, at least in the
absence of any undue administrative hardships; but see, People v. Firth, 3 N.Y. 2d
472, 168 N.Y.S. 2d 949, 950, 146 N.E. 2d 682, 683 (1957); Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 N.Y.
2d 471, 476, 154 N.Y.S. 2d 37, 41, 136 N.E. 2d 504, 507 (1956); People v. Hildebrandt,
308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E. 2d 377, 44 ALR 2d 449 (1955); McDonnel v. Commonwealth,
353 Mass. 277, 230 N.E. 2d 821 (1967); People v. McCluskey, 49 Misc. 2d 782, 268 N.Y.S.
2d 209 (1966).
31 People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y. 2d 307, 266 N.Y.S. 368 at 311-12 (1965); Solomon, This
New Fetish for Indigency: Justice and Poverty in an Affluent Society, 66 Col. L. R.
248, n. 77 (1966). "In its recent ruling that persons charged with traffic violations in
N.Y.C. need not be advised of their right to counsel, the New York Court of Appeals
estimated that the New York Criminal Court handled about 2,000,000 traffic offense
cases annually. The majority opinion, by Judge Scileppi, noted that "assigning coun-
sel to but 1 per cent of these cases could require the services of nearly half the attor-
neys registered in the state." See, People v. Letterio, No. 275, N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 30,
1965, p. 4. New York's highest court seems to be saying that the "constitutional"
rights of traffic offenders will be legitimated or denied on grounds of economy or
practicality, rather than on grounds of theory or principle."
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Chief Justice Desmond, finding it difficult to fathom the court's dis-
tinction between traffic offenses and crimes, dissented by distinguishing
People v. Witenski,32 where it was held that the defendant's constitu-
tional rights were violated by the failure to notify him of his right to
assignment of counsel even though the amount involved in the alleged
theft was no more than $2.00 and the imprisonment ordered was for a
few days only. Viewing the distinction as unfounded, the Chief Justice
condemned the majority for:
... holding that this constitutional right somehow disappeared
in the present cases simply because the legislature chose to label
these wrongdoings as "traffic infractions" rather than "crimes," and
even though the penalties here imposed are far greater than in
Witenski .... 1
The wording of the Bill of Rights does not distinguish between a
felony and a misdemeanor. The purpose of the guaranty is to give
assurance against deprivation (regardless of length) of life or liberty,
a result clearly overlooked in the above case.
The New Jersey courts, in accord with the majority, have held that
the breathalyzer "is a search of the person and therefore subject only to
the question of reasonableness," in State v. Kenderski,34 and that the
Miranda warnings are not applicable to prosecutions under the Motor
Vehicle Act.
35
Recently, in State v. Gillespie,36 the court again hid behind the
Schmerber shield but pointed out that: "the issue is close and weighty.
If we can avoid deciding it here, the Supreme Court not having spoken,
we should. We have decided to take no definite position on the point.
... The opinion seemed motivated by practical considerations which
favor avoiding Miranda in drunk driving cases, especially the frequency
of such prosecutions and the difficulties of mobilizing counsel quickly for
those arrestees unable to afford such protection.
A New York District Court held the test results admissible despite
the lack of warnings, by distinguishing between jus and lex. Noting that
32 15 N.Y. 2d 392, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 413 (1965).
33 People v. Letterio, supra note 30, at 315. The penalty in this case included a fine
of $1,030 or 135 days imprisonment: see, People v. Bliss, 53 Misc. 2d 472, 278 N.Y.S.
2d 732 (1967), where Judge Serra ruled that, traffic infractions are treated as mis-
demeanors for determination of jurisdiction, procedure, and manner of arrest only.
"... Unless traditional rules as to coercion have been violated so as to render a
confession involuntary as determined by a hearing held under statute, admissions or
confessions are admissible in traffic infraction cases .... This is a part of the sub-
stantive law of evidence and not a mere procedural facet."
34 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A. 2d 249 (1968); People v. Suchocki, 57 Misc. 2d 26, 291
N.Y.S. 2d 237 (1968).
35 State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 226 A. 2d 16 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd. 50 N.J.
361, 235 A. 2d 193 (1967); State v. Gillespie, 100 N.J. Super. 71, 241 A. 2d 239 (1968);
David v. Strelecki, 51 N.J. 563, 242 A. 2d 371 (1968).
36 100 N.J. Super. 71, 241 A. 2d 239 (1968).
37 Id. at 244.
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"right is the liberty to do or refrain from doing anything," and that "law
determines and binds," the court continued that "In a lawful society,
man willingly, when others are likewise willing, lays down his rights to
all things and acclimates himself to so much liberty or right as he would
allow other men. If it be otherwise, the result would be disastrous." 38
Certainly these are comforting words to one who is denied his basic
rights.
These few cases exemplify the reasoning given by the courts holding
the Miranda warnings an unnecessary privilege for the drunk driver.
Disregarding the "real" or "communicative" test, the fact that traffic
violations are misdemeanors, and the impracticality of obtaining counsel
for the accused, a few courts have found it impossible to disregard the
basic rights of the intoxicated driver. These courts have suppressed the
results of a breathalyzer test where the defendant was not adequately
warned of his rights. An unusual decision supporting this position came
from a New York court. In a decision ripe with legalistic prose, Judge
Raymond L. Wilkes posed the question: "Is it better to have 'advised'
and wonder, than never to have 'advised' at all?" 39 He answered with
an implied "affirmative" and then suppressed the results of a perform-
ance test given in the absence of the Miranda warnings. The Schmerber
test was neatly disposed of by citing the United States Supreme Court:
... To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort
will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of
physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit
and history of the Fifth Amendment. Such situations call to mind
the principle that the protection of the privilege "is as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard." 40
He then suggested that a performance test elicits such physiological
responses.
Support for his opinion was also found in United States v. Wade,41
decided one year after Schmerber, in which Justice Fortas wrote: "To
permit Schmerber to apply in any respect beyond its holding is in my
opinion indefensible." 42 Judge Wilkes continued, by stating:
The Performance Tests to which this defendant was subjected
without having been advised of his right to counsel . . . were re-
morselessly related to the condition of his sobriety, and hence, to the
questions of his guilt or innocence. These tests went to the very
38 People v. Suchocki, 57 Misc. 2d 26, 291 N.Y.S. 2d 237 (1968).
39 People v. McLaren, 55 Misc. 2d 676, 677; 285 N.Y.S. 2d 991, 992 (1967).
40 Id. at 680, citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562, 12 S. Ct. 195, 198
(1892).
41 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L, Ed, 2d 1149 (1967).
42 Id,
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marrow of the then burgeoning prosecution against him. We are as
much judged by what we do, as we are by what we say. Either can
be exculpatory as well as incriminating.43
Judge Wilkes found that the defendant communicated his guilt by par-
ticipating in the test. The Miranda warnings were found to be "ap-
posite." 44
People v. Sweeney 45 distinguished Schmerber and ruled that the
incriminating evidence must be suppressed. California statutes permit
the police to take a test despite defendant's refusal, 46 while in New York,
if the defendant chooses not to take the test, no test is administered.
Since the defendant could choose whether or not to submit to the test
and had a right to have his own physician administer the test he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right by being refused a call to his
attorney.
There are very few state cases supporting the proposition that a
drunk driver deserves the same protection as a hardened criminal.
There is even less federal authority for this position. In the recent case
of United States v. Green,47 the court boldly attacked the majority who
follow Schmerber by ruling that:
The distinctions between compulsions of a communicative nature
which are protected and those which produce only "identifying
physical characteristics" or become the source of "real or physical
evidence," which are not proctected by the Fifth Amendment are
nebulous.48
The Supreme Court seems to be waiting for the lower court de-
cisions to jell before it attempts to refine its Miranda mandate. The
Court's recent decision in United States v. Wade49 tends to indirectly
affirm the Schmerber holding. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice
Brennan said that the preparatory stage of scientifically analyzing the
accused's fingerprints or blood sample is not a critical stage requiring the
right to the presence of counsel. ". . . (these) are not critical stages since
there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stages might
43 People v. McLaren, supra note 39 at 995.
44 People v. McLaren, supra note 39 at 996; but see People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y. 2d 224,
239 N.E. 2d 351 (1968) where court held that where a defendant wishes to telephone
his lawyer there is no danger of delay in administering a drunkometer test which
would justify refusing request, but a defendant does not have an absolute right to
refuse the test until his lawyer reaches the scene if he cannot be reached promptly.
45 55 Misc. 2d 793, 286 N.Y.S. 2d 506 (1968); State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.
2d 691 (1967).
46 Annot. Calif. Code, Vehicle L. § 13353 (West, 1960 with 1968-9 supp.).
47 282 F. Supp. 373, 374 (S.D. Ind. 1968).
48 Ibid.
49 U.S. v. Wade, supra note 41.
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derogate from his right to a fair trial." 50 It seems that the Court is dis-
regarding the reason for the Miranda decision: "Privacy results in secre-
cy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact
goes on... ." 51 Despite the alleged accuracy of a drunkometer an attor-
ney would be an overseer of the procedure rather than a menace to law
enforcement. He would protect the right of his client to a meaningful
defense. After all, isn't that the purpose of providing the Miranda
warnings?
The Fortas dissent in Heller v. Connecticut52 presented the prag-
matic approach:
... Petitioner's lawyer, had petitioner's request to call him been
granted, might have performed an important function, which was
not capable of performance five or six hours later. He might have
insisted upon medical or chemical tests; he might have summoned
a private physician. At the very least, he could have informed the
arrested person's family and friends that the accused had not dis-
appeared without a 'trace, but was held, safely, if unhappily, in
jail. 53
Forty-five states have "implied consent" statutes. Each statute is
based upon the theory that there is no natural or unrestrained right to
operate a motor vehicle. It is a "privilege" which is subject to reasonable
regulation under the police power of the state.54 Since the statutes in
most states vary55 it is unlikely that an interstate traveler understands
his rights under the statute. For that matter, it is unlikely that a driver
in his own state will understand his rights and liabilities under the law.
An attorney is indispensable in advising the accused of his responsibil-
ities in regard to the statute. In State v. MobIey 56 a police officer told
the defendant that his refusal to take a test would be used as an assump-
tion of guilt in court. Had an attorney been present he could have ad-
vised the accused that the North Carolina statute had no such pro-
vision.57 Likewise, an attorney could advise the accused whether or not
to take the test. More importantly, an attorney could act as an outside
50 Ibid.; see, People v. Mulack, 40 Ill. 2d 429, 240 N.E. 2d 429 (1968), where court held
that the time of visual testing of person arrested for drunken driving and of breath
analysis was not a critical stage of the proceedings and a person arrested was not
entitled to Miranda warnings.
51 Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 448.
52 Heller v. Connecticut, supra note 3, cert. denied.
53 Ibid.
54 For cases upholding the. constitutionality of such statutes, see 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic, § 127 (1963); 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles, § 146 (1949).
Also see, State v. Hanusiak, 4 Conn. Cir. 34, 225 A. 2d 208 (1966); Bean v. Strelecki,
101 N.J. Super. 310, 244 A. 2d 316 (1968).
55 Erwin, op. cit. supra note 5.
56 273 N.C. 471, 160 S.E. 2d 334 (1968).
57 No. Car. Gen. Stat., § 20-139.1 (1965).
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observer clarifying any discrepancies between the facts observed and
those adduced in court.
Conclusion
A person accused of driving while intoxicated is more likely to be
an ordinary citizen than a hardened criminal. A few of the "boys" de-
cide to get together and celebrate, or a young college student sets out
to prove his virility. Naturally, this does not reduce the seriousness of
the offense. The inebriated driver causes an excessive loss of life annu-
ally and the process of his apprehension creates the need for a fair, en-
forceable, and accurate system of detection. But should society's interest
in promoting highway safety be superior to the protection of individual
rights? Death is final, whether premeditated or caused by a drunken
driver. Why should the former class be accorded superior rights over the
latter?
Those who seek to categorize the law will relish knowing that a
definite majority trend exists. These decisions refuse to extend Miranda
beyond its clear limits until the Supreme Court furnishes further guide-
lines. Schmerber remains as authority for the position that the character
of a defendant's blood relates to his corporeal features and does not
involve any testimonial compulsion prohibited by the Bill of Rights.
Whether or not the trend will change is questionable. Miranda
should not be employed to thwart law enforcement, but it should extend
to those who need its protection. When a misdemeanor requires in-
custody interrogation the unassisted layman is placed in a disadvan-
tageous position as the legal process begins. The warning principles of
Miranda must be applied reasonably and with common sense in order to
achieve the protection demanded by our system of jurisprudence.
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